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Fourteen months into the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, we identify key lessons in the global 
and national responses to the pandemic. The World Health Organization has played a pivotal 
technical, normative and coordinating role, but has been constrained by its lack of authority 
over sovereign member states. Many governments also mistakenly attempted to manage 
COVID-19 like influenza, resulting in repeated lockdowns, high excess morbidity and 
mortality, and poor economic recovery. Despite the incredible speed and approval of effective 
and safe vaccines, the emergence of new SARS-CoV-2 variants means that all countries will 







It has now been just over one year since the first two cases of coronavirus disease 
2019 (COVID-19) were confirmed in two Chinese nationals staying at a hotel in York, 
England on 31st January 20201. On 26th January 2021, the death toll from COVID-19 in the 
United Kingdom had surpassed 100,000 and there were reportedly over 30,000 daily cases of 
the disease, with an estimated 1 in 10 of people going on to experience the enduring effects of 
“long COVID”2.  The global death toll has just reached 2.1 million3. 
  
However, around the world, a varied picture has emerged3–5. Countries like China, 
Taiwan, New Zealand and Australia have managed to eliminate or get close to elimination of 
their epidemics caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-
2) relatively well3–5. Others such as Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Finland and Norway 
have managed to control it at low levels3. Sadly, both the US and the UK are still battling high 
numbers of daily cases, tens of thousands of deaths and an exhausted health workforce and 
overstretched health services 3,6,7. 
  
As the virus proliferated across the globe, it also revealed critical vulnerabilities in our 
global and national health governance systems that have resulted in these inadequate outbreak 
responses8,9. In this paper, we explore what we now know about the virus, identify key lessons 
learned about WHO and national governance and how this has impacted pandemic 
preparedness and response. 
  
  
What do we know scientifically? 
  
Since January 2020, a massive surge of research into COVID-19 has enabled the 
scientific and medical community to better understand how to manage and ultimately 
eliminate the virus through pharmaceutical and public health interventions10. Some of the key 
findings a year on are that transmission occurs through droplets and aerosols spread through 
breathing, coughing, speaking and sneezing11. Stopping the spread of COVID-19 requires 
people to avoid mixing through restrictions on social and economic life12,13.  
  
We have learned that COVID-19 causes more severe symptoms and death in those 
that are older14, who have underlying health issues (such as cardiovascular diseases and 
obesity) or are immunocompromised (such as malignancies and diabetes mellitus)15. We have 
learned that certain genetic markers can identify those more susceptible to respiratory 
failure16.  
 
We also have been learning about the long-term effects of COVID-19, so called “long 
COVID”, and the morbidity attached to having this virus17. Even after the recovery from 
acute illness caused by COVID-19, some patients continue to experience symptoms such as 
dyspnea and fatigue for weeks or months17. Also, the emergence of hyperinflammatory 
symptoms in children (multisystem inflammatory syndrome, or MIS-C) was reported to 
coincide with regional COVID-19 epidemics18.  
  
We have learned that immunity lasts at least 8 months19. We also have three licensed 
vaccines in the UK, which are already being rolled out and are effective at reducing severe 
COVID-19; although we don’t know how long immunity will last or whether they stop 
people being infectious 20. We have learned that the virus can mutate into various strains that 
can be more transmissible, more severe in health outcomes and possibly evade our natural or 
vaccine-induced immunity to the original SARS-CoV-2, requiring governments to plan for a 
cat and mouse game between vaccines and variants21.  
  
  
Role of WHO 
  
This pandemic has highlighted the interdependence of countries like never before, and 
most importantly the need for a globally coordinated governance response22. As countries 
attempted to respond to the COVID-19 outbreaks, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
was thrust into the spotlight as many countries looked to it for leadership and guidance23. In 
the process, it has faced inevitable criticism from various stakeholders. This criticism has 
unveiled – not for the first time – some misinterpretation of WHO’s mandate, its authority – 
or lack of – over its Member States, and a number of organisational and legal instrument 
constraints that have impacted pandemic preparedness and response 8,24–26. WHO has three 
key roles in addressing health emergencies: coordination, normative and technical steering27.  
  
As the United Nations’ only organization focused on health, it has a mandate to 
be “the directing and coordinating authority in international health work27.  During the 
COVID-19 outbreak, it has convened the 73rd World Health Assembly, and adopted a 
resolution to bring the world together to fight the pandemic and called for equitable access to 
all essential health products, such as vaccines, tests and treatments through the Access to 
COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator28. It has also enabled WHO to assemble the COVAX 
Facility as the vaccine pillar of the ACT Accelerator with other global actors, a mechanism 
designed to ensure timely access to a diverse set of vaccines for at least 20% of countries’ 
populations and the COVID-19 technology access pool (C-Tap), a platform to share patent-
protected trial data on emerging treatments29. There has been some success: to date, two 
billion doses of approved and pipeline vaccines have been pledged by wealthy nations, the 
European Union Commission, The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation among others30. 
However, as of January 2021, while vaccine roll-out is fully underway in many wealthy 
nations like the UK and the US, no COVID-19 vaccines have been administered in the 
continent of Africa and in other low and middle income countries (LMICs)31. This highlights 
the limited accountability of COVAX participants and perhaps inefficient incentives for 
wealthy nations, which have secured in some cases more doses than required to protect their 
populations32–34. Furthermore, by January 2021 C-Tap had attracted zero contributions, nine 
months after its launch33. 
  
Through the International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005), WHO also has a “central 
and historic responsibility” to manage the “global regime for the control of the international 
spread of disease35”. In its normative role, it has the “power to shape or influence global rules 
and norms and monitor compliance”36. It has arguably fulfilled a large part of this role by 
providing State-endorsed guidance and by setting norms and standards on outbreak 
preparedness and response, which include making use of measures such as border controls, 
finding cases, prioritising testing, contact tracing, isolating carriers of the virus and their 
contacts among other interventions35.  Critically, this guidance ensured that China reported 
the presence of a novel pathogen on 30th December 2019, and enabled WHO to declare a 
Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) – the highest level of alert – one 
month later on 30th January 2020, and notably 111 days before the UN Security Council 
adopted a resolution stating that the COVID-19 pandemic threatened international peace and 
security29,37. Four days later, it published a global strategy to tackle the pandemic, much of 
which remains valid today29.  
  
Moreover, within its technical capacity, it was able to send an international team on 
mission to China in February 2020 to collect key data on how the virus was spreading, the 
emerging disease profile and to understand lessons learned from policy responses in China up 
until that point38. Invaluable knowledge that was shared with the rest of the world in the same 
month. Furthermore, through its technical role, WHO has provided daily press briefings on a 
variety of scientific and policy topics including up-to-date epidemiology data, the nature of 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission and appropriate non-pharmaceutical intervention guidance, since 
a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) was declared by the WHO39.   
  
            However,  there was some criticism that the PHEIC should have been called earlier 
and that WHO’s diplomatic but perhaps opaque approach in working with China to 
investigate the source of the outbreak and rapidly share information demonstrated a lack of 
authority over Member States8. This was further publicised as a result of the Trump 
administration’s threat to withdraw from WHO40. However, the IHR only affords WHO 
normative power, a “soft” power that relies on Member States’ cooperation and cannot be 
legally enforced36. Throughout the pandemic WHO has struggled with country cooperation, 
namely because it does not have an official operational role in outbreak response41. This is 
also demonstrated in the failure of notable countries such as the UK and the US to implement 
some of WHO’s key public health guidance, such as ‘testing, testing, testing’, the provision 
of personal protective equipment and the importance of ramping up hospital capacity42. 
  
Furthermore, although WHO's technical capabilities during the pandemic are mostly 
to be lauded, it was slow to offer some key recommendations. Namely, on the potential risk 
of airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 under special circumstances (enclosed spaces, 
prolonged exposure, and inadequate ventilation43), the important role that masks44 have in 
preventing transmission and use of border controls.  History has shown us that the risk of 
doing nothing while waiting for the perfect data outweighs the risk of acting quickly with 
imperfect data. As Dr Mike Ryan, the executive director of the WHO’s emergencies 
Programme said, it is pertinent that everybody acts fast during an infectious disease outbreak 
and that we do not wait for “perfect data”45. Other technical areas where it fell short is in that 
its preparedness metrics46 seemingly did not account for variations in country leadership and 
political will, which have clearly had a big impact on the way countries have responded to the 
pandemic. Also, that it did not sufficiently focus on policies to minimise the impact that 
outbreaks have on increasing social, racial and health inequalities35. One major factor that has 
an impact on all of these coordination, normative and technical shortcomings is the limited 
funding available to WHO to operate optimally47. Critically, it has been suggested that the 
health and economic fallout of this unprecedented pandemic may spur new opportunities for 
more stable funding that might result in transformational change48. 
 
National Governance: Best Practice 
  
By the end of March 2020, almost all countries around the world had introduced nation-wide 
public health measures aimed at containing the spread of SARS-CoV-249. However, the 
measures used and subsequently the health and economic outcome of the response varied 
drastically50. This variation in response seems to reflect past experience in managing 
infectious disease outbreaks, societal values, long-term investment in healthcare and critically 
the political will of the government in power.  
  
Overall Strategic differences 
In Europe and the US, a combination of mitigation and suppression strategies have 
largely been used at various points in time. This is despite WHO advising countries to follow 
the model of elimination from February, 202051. The UK’s initial strategy was based largely 
on a response to pandemic flu, and government communications made several mentions of 
mild flu and cold-like symptoms as a result of COVID-19 for the majority of the 
population52. Elimination of the virus was touted as an impossible notion; that the best course 
of action was to shield the vulnerable as the virus made its way through the population to 
avoid overwhelming its health services and in an attempt to achieve so-called ‘herd 
immunity53’. While the successful use of measures such as social distancing and home 
isolation in China were noted by government advisors, it was perceived as postponing the 
inevitable54. This over-reliance on the flu model painted an inaccurate picture of how 
COVID-19 is transmitted: as COVID-19 is more contagious than the flu, it leads to super-
spreading events in crowded places. This evolved into a suppression strategy, where targeted 
health interventions have been used to reduce COVID-19 cases to “acceptable” levels for 
example by implementing mass testing, lockdowns and the use of masks in indoor public 
spaces55. In contrast, in New Zealand, Taiwan, Vietnam, South Korea, Australia and China, 
effort was taken to try to rapidly exclude community transmission of the virus using an 
elimination strategy. As Jacinda Arden, the prime minister of New Zealand recently said, 
even if elimination is not achieved, the approach “will result in a reduction of lives lost in the 
process”56. As the world has witnessed a close return to normalcy - at least within national 
borders - in countries that sought an elimination approach, there appears to be greater 
enthusiasm to pursue this approach among academics and politicians4.  In contrast, those who 
didn’t have succumbed to repeat national lockdowns throughout the year, high mortality 
rates, long-term health consequences in survivors - up to 10% in the UK - in-direct health 
impacts, long-term economic loss, and an increase in social and health inequalities57.  
  
One factor that has impacted the strategies employed by governments is the 
relatively low Case Fatality Rate (CFR) of COVID-19 at 2%58. The CFRs of severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), are much 
higher than that of COVID-19 at 9-10% and 36%, respectively58.  Based on past experiences, 
most countries would have adopted an elimination strategy if the CFR for COVID-19 was 
higher, because it would have been impossible to let SARS-CoV-2 spread within 
communities51. However, CFR is a deceptive metric because the underlying SARS-CoV-2 
virus spreads more easily among people, leading to more cases. Hospitalisation rates are a 
better measure of COVID-19 prevalence because it also reveals the level of community 
spread, but also gives insight into hospital capacity59.  
  
Public health measures 
We also now know that effective use of test, trace and isolate (TTI) programmes, 
where infected people and their contacts are rapidly identified and provided financial support 
to isolate during the incubation period of the virus along with border controls and now an 
efficient and equitable roll-out of emerging vaccines are key to controlling this virus. 
  
            In East Asian and Pacific countries, TTI, the use of strict border measures and good 
voluntary public health guidance was central to their elimination strategies, allowing them to 
rapidly manage local flare-ups. It also resulted in relatively few lockdowns50.  In Hong Kong, 
uptake of testing was encouraged by paying people to get tested. Germany also had a 
relatively lower CFR compared to its European counterparts like Italy and the UK, in part 
because of its early and broad testing strategy5.  
  
The development of new vaccines has provided governments with an additional tool 
to protect its population. Governments in high-income countries, in particular, have embarked 
on mass efforts to roll-out the vaccine, starting with their most vulnerable groups. By mid-
January 2021, Israel had administered the first dose of the vaccine to over 25% of its 
population, and 75% of those over the age of 60 years by mid-January. There are early 
indications that this is having a positive impact with a reduction from 30% to 7% in the 
number of critically ill patients in this age bracket two weeks post-vaccination60. However, 
questions on the protection provided until the second dose is administered remains. 
Additionally, inequitable access, both globally and nationally are an issue; in Israel cities of a 
lower socio-economic status had administered fewer vaccinations than their wealthier 
counterparts61. What is clear is that a fast roll-out is essential to stopping community 




The disproportionate impact that this pandemic has had on vulnerable populations and 
ethnic minority groups around the world must also not be overlooked62. This is typically a 
result of riskier work and living conditions, limited access to protective wear - and in some 
countries treatments - and the limited availability of financial protection to ensure that key 
public health measures such as isolation and distancing can be implemented62. Governments 
have learned - often as a result of a public outcry - that identifying these vulnerable groups 
quickly, and implementing tailored interventions to reduce the risk of infection in these 
groups is critical. For example, in Hong Kong people were paid to encourage testing and in 
the UK mass testing was eventually introduced into care homes to try to identify and isolate 
cases quickly63,64.  
  
Other key lessons are that elimination is achievable if swift political commitment is 
made early on in an outbreak, and by accepting short-term stringent public health measures, 
viral community transmission is reduced, fewer covid-19 cases are detected and economic 
loss is minimal4. At the global level, however, we should also recognise that not every 
country is able to implement the same public health measures. Countries like Japan could not 
legally enforce strict containment measures because of its infringement on human rights65. 
Furthermore, political disorder and the aggressive use of force by the police in Nigeria 
intensified when strict public health interventions were enforced to limit protests66. 
  
Leadership and communication  
            Clear and evidence-based communication during an outbreak is critical to build trust 
with the public and to ensure adherence to public health measures and successful 
containment. Most importantly, understanding a government’s definition of a successful 
outcome and the strategy employed to achieve this needs to be well-defined67. Some leaders 
seem to have got the balance right, for example, in New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Senegal while others have struggled, for example, in the US and the UK. As the pandemic 
has unfolded, knowledge about the virus, how to manage it and the interventions available to 
us have rapidly evolved. Some governments have been good at communicating uncertainty 
and necessary changes in strategy when better options have become clear. For instance, in 
New Zealand, after the PHEIC was declared by WHO, the government communicated that an 
elimination strategy was being adopted68.  
  
In the US and the UK, it has at times been unclear what success would look like, how 
this is measured, and what approach is being adopted: exclusion, elimination, suppression or 
containment of the virus4. In the US, the Trump administration regularly ignored scientific 
evidence and the Federal government “abandoned disease control to the states69”, resulting in 
a massive failure in handling COVID-19. In the British context, sometimes questions about 
changes were often met with protestations of having “world-beating” approaches, a symptom 
of British exceptionalism that underestimated the virus in the first place70.  Moreover, some 
government ministers in the UK recently announced that NHS hospitals were full because the 
public was not adhering to public health measures71. Shifting responsibility to individuals 
alone through such disparaging messaging can lead to a lack of compliance to government 
rules. 
  
Economy v. Health 
  
Throughout the pandemic a false dichotomous argument pitting public health and 
economic success has emerged72. In fact, one common argument against stringent public 
health measures like lockdown was the potential damage it inflicted on the national economy. 
It is incorrect that a loss of economic growth and job losses are a primary consequence of 
social-distancing measures rather than the virus itself72.”  Not taking strict public health 
measures to prevent the national economy during the pandemic is a short-sighted policy; in 
the long run, a brief closure and temporal subsidisation has proven to be more cost-beneficial 
than opening the economy during the pandemic. Although, New Zealand experienced an 
annual contraction in real gross domestic product (GDP) of 6.1%, this is much lower than 
other comparable countries and in Taiwan a net GDP of 0% was sustained73.  Furthermore, 
economists argue that the estimated economic cost of the pandemic in the United States is 16 
trillion USD74. Effective public health measures, if implemented, can reduce these financial 
costs significantly. Contrary to the false—yet common—dichotomy, protecting the health of 
the people is equivalent to protect the wealth of the people. Similar analyses have shown that 
this was also the case in the 1918 influenza pandemic75. 
  
Conclusion:  
Looking ahead to year two of the pandemic, our collective progress will be dependent on a 
coordinated global effort to leave no one behind. Although the mass vaccination roll-out will 
dominate COVID-19 policy this year, the emergence of new SARS-CoV-2 variants that may 
escape the body’s neutralizing antibody response and continued inequitable access to 
vaccines indicates that the COVID-19 pandemic will continue. This may well turn out to be 
the year of variants and vaccines. However, now we are armed with knowing what works, 
what doesn’t and the range of interventions needed to keep numbers low. Let’s fix our 
fragmented global health system and follow the elimination playbook together: because if 
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